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In 1999, the rising sea level swallowed two islands of the nation Kiribati.1 Rising sea level2 is one of the effects of climate change to which small island nations are particu-
larly susceptible.3 Considering that the average elevation of 
this nation of ninety thousand people on thirty-three islands and 
atolls4 is only about two meters above sea level,5 it is no surprise 
that Kiribati’s President Anote Tong considers the rising sea a 
threat to the very existence of his nation.6 Taking a cue from a 
policy first announced by the Maldives, President Tong has sug-
gested that the solution to his nation’s disappearance could be 
purchasing land in another country to relocate the entire popula-
tion of Kiribati.7 This unprecedented situation raises the ques-
tion: what would be the legal status of an I-Kiribati or Maldives 
population on the run from the rising waters?
Estimates vary, but it is undisputed that current and future 
effects of climate change, including droughts, floods, desertifica-
tion, and rising sea level, will displace millions each year.8 At least 
some displacement will occur across borders, especially when 
dealing with small islands nations. 9 In spite of this potential for 
massive displacement, at present no international legal framework 
exists which will recognize and protect those displaced by envi-
ronmental factors, even though the concepts of “environmental” 
and “climate” refugees have been contemplated since the 1980s.10
Two different approaches to the legal problems have been 
proposed. On one hand there have been voices calling for an 
expansion of the legal definition of “refugee” to incorporate 
environmentally displaced persons,11 while others argue that a 
new and separate legal framework be created.12 Island nations, 
while supportive of finding an international legal solution, are 
unwilling to wait for international consensus and are taking their 
own measures to avoid catastrophe.13
“Refugee” is a legal term, narrowly-defined by the 1951 UN 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, protecting per-
sons who fled their home country in fear of persecution for rea-
sons of race, religion, political opinion, or ethnicity.14 In 2006, 
the Maldives proposed amending the Convention to include 
“climate refugee.”15 Recently, the Bangladeshi Finance Min-
ister called for “[t]he [C]onvention on refugees [to] be revised 
to protect [those displaced by climate change.]”16 However, the 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) is concerned 
that the inclusion of environmental or climate refugee could 
potentially undermine the clarity of current standards.17 Further, 
UNHCR is already under pressure from host countries to reduce 
the burden of refugees18 and it is also concerned that renegotia-
tion of the Convention could result in the lowering of existing 
protection standards.19
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For these reasons, some argue that dealing with climate 
refugees calls for a new and independent legal framework.20 
Any new framework would need to draw upon widely agreed 
principles and connect the protection of those displaced with the 
broader international legal framework on climate change.21 The 
international instrument would also need to address the practi-
calities of enforcement and establishment of rights.22
One proposed convention from the University of Limo-
ges23 recognizes different types of environmental displacement, 
protecting generally against “natural and technological disas-
ters.”24 It calls for the creation of a monitoring agency akin to 
the UNHCR.25 The convention would recognize the duty of the 
international community to assist a State that suffers from eco-
logical disasters26 and the right to “conserve the nationality of 
[the environmentally displaced person’s] state of origin . . . and 
to acquire the nationality of the receiving state.”27 This last right 
is especially important for a nation such as Kirbati, where com-
plete loss of territory could result in the destruction of its legal 
status as a nation.
Territory is one of the key elements of nationhood28 and 
without physical territory under sovereign control, no nation can 
exist.29 On the other hand, nationality is considered a fundamen-
tal right in international law.30 How can this right be squared 
with permanent loss of sovereign territory and nationhood? It 
is unlikely that another nation would accept a cash payment to 
transfer the sovereignty of a part of its existing territory. Cer-
tainly, consideration would have to be made for those already 
settled upon the land.31 Without an existing legal framework, 
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perhaps Kiribati and the Maldives are doing the right thing to 
proactively seek out alternatives.
Beyond purchasing land, one plan currently underway is 
to secure “merit-based relocation.”32 Island nationals would be 
trained in needed professions (e.g. nursing) in other countries, 
with the ability to stay and seek citizenship there.33 In this way, 
pockets of I-Kiribati community would be built up worldwide, 
facilitating future resettlement.34 Furthermore, with removal of 
much of the population, it would be possible to build up one 
island and use it to “anchor” the sovereignty of the nation in 
the event of drastic sea level rise.35 However, even if the state 
continued to exist in legal terms36 it is unclear how it would 
function.37
The best choice may be for an island nation to be absorbed into 
another nation, using its own sovereignty to pay for relocation.38 
For example, in exchange for control of Kiribati’s sovereign terri-
tory, India could accept Kiribati’s population and provide resettle-
ment assistance such as language training, vocational training, and 
financial aid.39 An end to nationhood, incorporation and reloca-
tion of an island nation in exchange for the sovereign control of its 
resources and maritime zone would then benefit both parties.40
The world will see an increase in environmentally displaced 
persons in the coming years. Room must be made for them with 
the creation of a new and separate legal framework.41 However, 
this will take time. In the meantime, small island nations are best 
served to take matters into their own hands.
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